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APPOINTMENTS, INNOVATION, AND THE 
JUDICIAL–POLITICAL DIVIDE 
GILLIAN E. METZGER† 
ABSTRACT 
  The federal appointments process is having its proverbial day in 
the sun. The appointment and removal of federal officers figured 
centrally in the Supreme Court’s two major recent separation-of-
powers decisions, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board and National Labor Relations Board v. 
Noel Canning. The appointments process has featured even more 
prominently in the political sphere, figuring in a number of 
congressional–presidential confrontations. Such simultaneous top 
billing in the judicial and political spheres is hardly coincidental. 
After all, it was President Obama’s use of the Recess Appointments 
Clause in response to pro forma sessions that triggered the Court’s 
engagement with the Clause in Noel Canning. But the relationship 
between the Clause’s judicial and political manifestations is more 
complicated, and more fraught, than mere practical causality. The 
Roberts Court’s approach to appointments and separation of powers 
issues stands out for its Burkean resistance to innovation. By contrast, 
the dominant characteristic of appointments in the political sphere is 
novelty and embrace of new institutional arrangements. 
  This Article explores these differing judicial and political 
approaches to innovation, and the implications of the emerging 
contrast for federal administration. Although the Court’s resistance to 
innovation might appear a useful prophylactic against efforts to bend 
the Constitution in the name of political expediency, the constitutional 
basis for such a general suspicion of innovation is lacking. 
Particularly given the political transformations occurring in response 
to polarization, a stance of suspicion sets the Court on a course of 
confrontation with the other two branches that is hard to justify. A 
more nuanced approach that pays greater attention to political reality 
would allow the Court to both better titrate its interventions to 
constitutional structure and minimize the disruptive effects of its 
decisions. 
 
Copyright © 2015 Gillian E. Metzger. 
 † Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal appointments process is having its proverbial day in 
the sun. The appointment and removal of federal officers figured 
centrally in the Supreme Court’s two major recent separation-of-
powers decisions, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board1 and National Labor Relations Board v. 
Noel Canning.2 To be sure, appointment and removal have long 
played a major role in judicial analysis of the scope of presidential 
power.3 But for over two decades these issues had lain largely 
 
 1. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 2. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). A third contender 
for this status was Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 
1225 (2015), which involved separation-of-powers and due-process challenges to the Passenger 
Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. The D.C. Circuit had held that the Act 
represented an unconstitutional delegation of standard-setting authority to a private entity, 
Amtrak, but the Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming its earlier decision in Lebron v. National 
Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), that Amtrak is a governmental actor for 
constitutional purposes. Assoc. of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1228. In so doing, the Court 
remanded for the D.C. Circuit to consider “substantial questions . . . implicating the 
Constitution’s structural separation of powers and the Appointments Clause,” id., and thus the 
case may return to the Court in the future. 
 3. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–07, 161, 173–74 (1926).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612447 
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judicially dormant, which alone makes their recent star turn notable. 
Moreover, the net result is that the Roberts Court has used 
appointments, and more broadly the issue of control over federal 
officers, as the frame for articulating its separation-of-powers vision. 
The appointments process has featured even more prominently 
in the political sphere, figuring in a number of congressional–
presidential confrontations. Again, the use of appointments as an 
occasion for political contestation has a long historical pedigree.4 But 
appointments have become the brave new world of American politics. 
Senators have used their confirmation role to resist presidential 
initiatives in new ways, such as delaying key executive-branch 
appointments and holding pro forma sessions to prevent recess 
appointments.5 The President has responded in kind, wielding the 
recess-appointments power assertively and experimenting with White 
House policy czars and other executive-branch positions.6 Moreover, 
these growing political confrontations over appointments have 
provoked a major change to the appointments process, with the 
Senate changing rules to free executive-branch and judicial 
appointments from the filibuster.7 
Such simultaneous top billing in the judicial and political spheres 
is hardly coincidental. After all, it was President Obama’s use of the 
Recess Appointments Clause in response to pro forma sessions that 
triggered the Court’s engagement with the Clause in Noel Canning. 
But the relationship between the Clause’s judicial and political 
manifestations is more complicated, and more fraught, than mere 
practical causality. The Roberts Court’s approach to appointments 
and separation-of-powers issues stands out for its Burkean resistance 
 
 4. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (Duke Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003) (providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the presidential–senatorial conflicts over executive appointments 
since the Early Republic). 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See generally Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the 
White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011) (describing the emergence of White 
House policy czars in the Obama administration); Lawfulness of Recess Appointments during a 
Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C., 2012 WL 
168645 (2012) (presidential use of recess appointments during pro forma Senate sessions); 
Whether the Special Master for Troubled Asset Relief Program Executive Compensation Is a 
Principal Officer under the Appointments Clause, 34 Op. O.L.C., 2010 WL 4963118 (2010) 
(assessing the constitutionality of the appointments process for the TARP “pay czar,” who is 
charged with reviewing executive compensation at companies receiving TARP funds). 
 7. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits the Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A1. 
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to innovation.8 New institutional arrangements or assertions of power 
at the federal level are presumed constitutionally suspect; structural 
experimentation is a cause for concern rather than celebration. By 
contrast, the dominant characteristic of appointments in the political 
sphere is novelty and innovation. This characteristic holds true of 
national politics and legislation writ large. Established norms and 
conventions that governed Congress have fallen by the wayside, 
replaced by new arenas of political contestation and dispute. 
Innovation is even clearer in the executive branch, with the President 
responding to congressional inaction and resistance with new 
administrative measures. Innovation has been a significant feature of 
recent periods of united government as well, with the dominant party 
taking advantage of rare alignment of the branches to pass significant 
legislative measures. 
This contrast between judicial conservatism and political 
innovation is striking. Whether the Court is responding to the 
political climate or acting independently is hard to know. But these 
contrasting approaches suggest that disagreement between the Court 
and the political branches on matters of governmental structure is 
likely to continue. That the Court’s decisions fail to engage with 
current political realities is as troubling. The signal characteristic of 
national politics today is increasing political polarization, what some 
call hyperpolarization.9 Political polarization has a close relationship 
to political innovation. Not only has deepening polarization instigated 
many novel congressional and executive measures, but efforts to 
mitigate polarization in Congress are also likely to entail further 
structural changes. Yet recognition of the current polarized political 
environment is notably absent from the Court’s separation-of-powers 
analysis. 
The Court’s resistance to innovation might appear a useful 
prophylactic against efforts to bend the Constitution in the name of 
political expediency. But such a general suspicion of innovation lacks 
a constitutional basis. Particularly given the political transformations 
occurring in response to polarization, a stance of suspicion sets the 
Court on a course of confrontation with the other two branches that is 
 
 8. For discussions of the Burkean approach to constitutional interpretation, see Thomas 
W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 509–15 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutional Personae, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 433, 443–45, 454–55. 
 9. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 276–81 (2011). 
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hard to justify. A more nuanced approach that pays greater attention 
to political reality would allow the Court to both better titrate its 
interventions to constitutional structure and minimize its decisions’ 
disruptive effects. 
Part I examines the Court’s recent appointments decisions, 
identifying resistance to innovation as a theme running throughout 
the Roberts Court’s structural jurisprudence. Part II turns to the 
political sphere, examining polarization trends and the relationship 
between polarization and political innovation. Part III then assesses 
the relationship between these judicial and political trends, analyzing 
their likely combined effect and potential normative implications. 
I.  APPOINTMENTS IN THE COURTS 
The federal appointments process is no stranger to constitutional 
litigation. Historically, the Appointments Clause surfaced only 
occasionally and then primarily with respect to the question of who 
counted as a government officer, reflecting the nation’s heavy 
reliance on private individuals working on a fee basis to carry out the 
work of government.10 Over the twentieth century, the Clause made a 
more regular appearance. A few cases traced the line between 
principal and inferior officers,11 while others addressed the limits of 
Congress’s role in appointments.12 But most prominent judicial 
discussions of the constitutional scheme governing officers have long 
focused more on removal from office rather than appointment to it. 
Although much scholarly ink has been spilled debating the scope of 
the President’s removal power, the Court upheld for-cause removal 
protections in the early New Deal and adhered to that position fifty 
years later in its next serious engagement with the issue.13 
 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 319, 
326–27 (1890) (addressing whether a merchant appraiser, whose fee was imposed on the 
plaintiff importer, was an officer); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 511–12 (1878) 
(addressing whether a surgeon examining pensioners on request for a fee was an officer). See 
generally NICHOLAS PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE (2014) (analyzing the evolution 
of the constitutional norm against profiteering by government officials). 
 11. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661–65 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654, 671 (1988). 
 12. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 289–90 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 141 (1976). 
 13. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92; Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
627–29 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132–33, 163–64 (1926). 
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The Roberts Court’s decisions in Free Enterprise Fund and Noel 
Canning thus served to move the President’s power to appoint and 
remove government officers back into the constitutional limelight. 
More than this, both decisions showcase the Roberts Court’s 
approach to separation of powers writ large. The two opinions are a 
striking pair, linked by more similarities than immediately meets the 
eye. Perhaps their most dominant shared theme is a Burkean 
resistance to innovation. 
A. The Roberts Court and the Appointments Process: Free 
Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning Compared 
Free Enterprise Fund fits neatly within the vein of decisions 
assessing presidential control over officers solely through a removal 
lens. There, the Roberts Court addressed a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), which exercises regulatory, enforcement, and disciplinary 
authority over the accounting industry. Created by the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act and statutorily denominated a nonprofit corporation, the 
PCAOB initially was composed of five members appointed by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and strongly protected 
from removal except for good cause.14 By a vote of five to four, the 
Court held that this arrangement violated the Constitution’s vesting 
of the executive power in the President and the Take Care Clause 
because the members of the SEC were themselves protected from 
removal except by cause.15 
According to Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, the 
PCAOB’s double for-cause protection crossed the constitutional line 
because it eviscerated the President’s control over the Board and 
thereby impaired his ability to ensure that the laws be faithfully 
executed.16 On this view, the ability to remove officers is the linchpin 
for accountability in government, and no other system of oversight—
not the ability to determine an agency’s budget, approve its rules, or 
review its determinations and decisions—matters in constitutional 
separation-of-powers analysis.17 Indeed, the majority even 
downplayed the significance of presidential appointment, concluding 
that once the PCAOB members’ for-cause protection was severed 
 
 14. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–88 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 483, 494–99. 
 16. Id. at 495–99. 
 17. Id. at 497–506. 
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from the statute and they were rendered removable at will by the 
SEC, they became inferior officers whose selection did not need to be 
vested in the President.18 
The Court’s 2014 decision in Noel Canning is a more unusual 
beast, not only addressing the separation-of-powers implications of 
appointment directly but doing so in the course of an exegesis of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, rarely the subject of sustained judicial 
attention.19 The narrow issue in Noel Canning was the 
constitutionality of President Obama’s use of the recess-appointments 
power when the Senate was in a pro forma session.20 But, responding 
to the D.C. Circuit’s decision below, the Court ruled more broadly, 
holding (again five to four) that the Clause could be used during 
intrasession as well as intersession recesses and with respect to 
vacancies that preexisted a recess as well as those that came into 
existence once the recess was underway.21 The Court then proceeded 
to rule that President Obama’s recess appointments nonetheless were 
unconstitutional because a pro forma session counts as a session if the 
Senate says so, provided that it retains the ability to do Senate 
business.22 As a result, only a three-day recess existed when the 
President made his appointments, and that was too short to trigger 
the Recess Appointments Clause.23 
Far more important than these specific holdings, however, are 
what the decisions signal about separation-of-powers analysis under 
the Roberts Court. Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning appear at 
the outset to be analytic opposites, decided by reversed 5–4 lineups 
and contrasting methodologies, with the difference in majorities 
chalked up to Justice Kennedy’s changing allegiances. Separation-of-
powers opinions are often distinguished by whether they reflect a 
formalistic emphasis on literal constitutional text and distinct 
branches and categories of power or a functionalist attention to actual 
power relationships, underlying balance, flexibility, and efficacy.24 On 
 
 18. Id. at 509–11. 
 19. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (noting that the 
Court was “interpret[ing] the Clause . . . for the first time in more than 200 years”). 
 20. Id. at 2557. 
 21. Id. at 2556–67, 2561, 2573. 
 22. Id. at 2574–77. 
 23. Id. at 2557. 
 24. For discussion of the difference between formalist and functionalist approaches to the 
separation of powers, see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of 
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–47 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional 
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this score, as Professor Ronald Krotoszynski has argued, Free 
Enterprise Fund appears to offer a formalistic take on the separation 
of powers.25 It viewed the Vesting and Take Care Clauses as 
mandating a clear line of removal authority from the President down 
and dismissed the many administrative mechanisms through which 
the SEC in fact exercised broad control as irrelevant, insisting that 
“[t]he Framers did not rest our liberties on such bureaucratic 
minutiae.”26 A similar formalist cast is evident in Stern v. Marshall,27 in 
which the Court drew a sharp line between adjudication of private 
and public rights and identified the former as the constitutionally 
protected terrain of Article III courts.28 
In Noel Canning, by contrast, functionalism reigned triumphant. 
Now writing for the majority, Justice Breyer repeatedly concluded 
that the relevant constitutional text was ambiguous and put prime 
emphasis instead on achieving its underlying purposes.29 That 
purpose, in the majority’s eyes, was to “ensure the continued 
functioning of the Government while the Senate is away.”30 This 
functionalist bent was reinforced by the majority’s express reliance on 
the historical practice as an important interpretive guide, cautioning 
that the Court “must hesitate to upset the compromises and working 
arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves 
have reached.”31 Here the formalist analysis was relegated to Justice 
Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment, which insisted that the 
relevant text was clear and rejected reliance on political practice in 
resolving separation-of-powers disputes.32 
 
Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
488 (1987). 
 25. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the 
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight 
of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1605–07, 1615–18 
(2012). 
 26. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010).  
 27. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 28. Id. at 2608–09 (2011); see also id. at 2619 (“It goes without saying that ‘the fact that a 
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’” (quoting INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))); Krotoszynski, supra note 25, at 1619–20. 
 29. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564, 2567–69 (2014). 
 30. Id. at 2553. 
 31. Id. at 2560.  
 32. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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Combined with the consistent and even split among the other 
Justices, this shift in methodological approach suggests that the 
Roberts Court is deeply divided on separation-of-powers matters. But 
more analytic similarity exists across these decisions than first 
appears. Despite its overall formalistic stance, the Free Enterprise 
Fund majority also heavily emphasized more functionalist concerns 
with political accountability and the dangers of political diffusion.33 It 
was careful to avoid disrupting existing governance relationships, 
expressly distinguishing other potential examples of double for-cause 
arrangements.34 Moreover, the Court’s remedial approach—simply 
excising the for-cause protection enjoyed by the PCAOB—both 
served to preserve the Sarbanes–Oxley regulatory scheme and 
signaled that the Court was unlikely to call into question established 
independent-agency structures with only one level of for-cause 
protection.35 Meanwhile, the Noel Canning Court unanimously held 
that a pro forma session is not a recess, despite the fact that the 
Senate’s use of pro forma sessions to preempt the recess-
appointments power would appear equally at odds with the Recess 
Appointments Clause’s concern to ensure that “the President . . . 
obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to 
its recess, cannot confirm them.”36 Further, the majority justified its 
 
 33. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of 
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43–48 (2014) (“[T]he Court in Free Enterprise Fund 
ultimately relied on fairly high-level functional considerations to draw the constitutional line at 
issue.”); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 25, at 1617–18 (noting how practical concerns with 
political accountability surface in the majority opinion, despite its formalist tone and 
orientation). 
 34. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506–07 (2010). 
 35. For a contrary view, see generally Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for 
Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014). A similar concern with not disrupting 
established administrative relationships is evident in Stern, with the Court there again carving 
out administrative agencies from the decision’s scope by ipse dixit. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594, 2612 n.6, 2615, 2619 (2011). But see New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor Relations 
Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 678, 679–83, 688 (2010) (holding that the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(NLRB’s) effort to delegate decisionmaking power to just two board members to address the 
lack of additional board members was invalid under the National Labor Relations Act, thereby 
nullifying nearly 600 NLRB decisions). 
 36. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2568; see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending 
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments 
Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1533–42 (2015) (emphasizing Noel Canning’s 
mixed formalist and functionalist character). Although minority political opposition was the 
barrier to confirmation of the NLRB nominees, what enabled that opposition to continue 
without the Senate majority forcing the issue so as to be able to recess was the option of pro 
forma sessions. See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate 
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C., 2012 WL 168645 (2012).  
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decision to reject the pro forma recess appointments on formalist 
grounds, emphasizing that the Constitution’s text grants broad 
discretion to the Senate to control its own operations and that the 
recess-appointments procedure is expressly limited to the recess 
context.37 
Both decisions share another trait: reluctance to engage with 
current governmental realities. In terms Professor Richard Pildes has 
recently used, these decisions represent instances of “institutional 
formalism,” in that they approach the governmental institutions 
involved “at a high level of abstraction and generality,” without 
reference to “more contingent, specific features of institutional 
behavior, or to the particular persons who happen to occupy the 
relevant offices, or to the ways in which the institution actually 
functions in particular eras.”38 This characteristic is particularly 
evident in Free Enterprise Fund, in which the majority zeroed in on 
removal over other control mechanisms and paid little heed to 
determining whether removal in practice served the pivotal role that 
the majority ascribed to it.39 The majority did underscore the way 
agency insulation from the President could enhance congressional 
power, a somewhat realist perspective on independent agencies. But 
it never examined whether enhancing congressional power was a 
realistic outcome with respect to the PCAOB, given the SEC’s broad 
authority over the PCAOB’s operations.40 
Noel Canning, by contrast, appears much more attuned to the 
details of governmental functioning, with lengthy discussion of actual 
recess-appointments practice and nuanced assessments of 
institutional interactions.41 Indeed, the majority itself proclaimed that 
it was “look[ing] to the actual practice of Government to inform [its] 
interpretation” of the Recess Appointments Clause.42 But most of this 
contextual sensitivity has a distinctive historical flavor. Current 
 
 37. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2574–75. The majority added a functionalist aspect by 
requiring that the Senate be available to conduct Senate business, but made clear that this 
element is to be determined in a formalist fashion by examining the terms of Senate rules. Id. 
 38. Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public 
Law, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2. 
 39. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 494–502. 
 40. Id. at 499–500. 
 41. See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2570–73 (discussing past practice and institutional 
interactions with respect to recess appointments for preexisting vacancies); id. at 2569 (noting 
that “[a]cting officers may have less authority than Presidential appointments.”). 
 42. Id. at 2578. 
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political realities only enter in the discussion of the status of pro 
forma sessions, and there the discussion has a remarkably anodyne 
quality.43 From reading the opinion, it would be difficult to get a sense 
of the growing polarization and collapse in institutional norms that 
underlay the Senate Democrats’ first use of the pro forma session to 
forestall recess appointments in 2007 and the Republicans’ decision to 
adopt the strategy in 2011.44 The closest the majority came to 
acknowledging that backdrop was its dismissal of the Solicitor 
General’s concerns with disruption to the constitutional separation-
of-powers balance by noting that “the Recess Appointments Clause is 
not designed to overcome serious institutional friction.”45 
One particular manifestation of this reluctance to engage with 
governmental realities is both decisions’ lack of attention to high-
level positions below the top of the agency. Many such officials enjoy 
senior executive service (SES) or general civil-service protections 
against termination except for cause, and thus would seem (as Justice 
Breyer argued in dissent) to present the same double for-cause 
problem. Moreover, evidence exists that the agency staff level—
noncareer SES or what are known as Schedule C appointees—is 
where loyalty is injected into agencies.46 But Free Enterprise Fund 
simply carved such high-level agency officials out of its constitutional 
analysis, noting that “none of the positions [the dissent] identifies are 
similarly situated to the [PCAOB]” and “[n]othing in our opinion . . . 
should be read to cast doubt on the use of what is colloquially known 
as the civil service system.”47 Noel Canning similarly ignored the 
presence of lower-ranked agency staff in its consideration of the 
scope of the recess-appointments power, including only a passing 
 
 43. Id. at 2575–77. 
 44. On this backdrop, see generally Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the 
Law—Presidential Authority: V. Executive Appointments, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2135, 2144–53 
(2012) (tracing the significant conflicts of the last several decades over the power of the 
American presidency, including the appointments power and the use of pro forma sessions). A 
similar political backdrop underlay the NLRB’s loss of a quorum in 2008 and again went 
unmentioned by the Roberts Court in its decision striking down the NLRB’s effort to keep 
operating by delegating power to two members. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 676–78 (2010). 
 45. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577. 
 46. See David E. Lewis & Richard W. Waterman, The Invisible Presidential Appointments: 
An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-11, 43 PRES. STUD. Q. 35, 51 
(2013). 
 47. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 (2010). 
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reference to the lesser status of acting heads.48 Yet the presence of 
agency personnel, including high-level officers whose tenure is 
unaffected by a vacancy at the top, seems quite relevant to assessing 
the extent to which allowing recess appointments during intrasession 
breaks or for preexisting vacancies is necessary to realize the 
constitutional goal of “preserv[ing] ‘the vigour of government’ at 
times when . . . [the Senate] is in recess.”49 
To be fair, in ignoring agency personnel below the agency-head 
level, Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning were simply following a 
long line of Supreme Court precedent. Other than appointments 
cases that address whether a particular officer is an inferior or 
principal officer, the separation-of-powers jurisprudence pays little 
attention to agencies’ internal structure and staffing.50 By contrast, 
internal agency design and developments such as politicization of 
agency personnel are an increasing focus of political debate and 
scholarship.51 In particular, delays in filling high-level agency posts 
that require Senate confirmation are identified as undermining 
agencies’ ability to function even when agency heads are in place.52 
Moreover, scholars have documented not only a “staggering” 
increase in the number of agency positions requiring Senate 
confirmation, mostly “occurring at secondary and tertiary levels and 
 
 48. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2569. 
 49. Id. at 2577 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also id. at 
2609–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 50. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 
1859–63 (2015). 
 51. For scholarly interest, see, for example, DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 1, 
13–19 (2008) (detailing political appointments, particularly outside the cabinet or agency-head 
level); Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). For political 
interest, see Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan. 18, 2007) (adding a 
requirement that approval by agency regulatory-policy officers ordinarily be required for 
rulemaking to commence and that such officers be presidential appointees chosen in 
consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)); Jonathan Weisman, Liberal 
Treasury Nominee’s Wall St. Prowess May Be a Vulnerability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/business/economy/liberal-treasury-nominees-deal-making-
prowess-could-be-a-liability-.html (noting Senator Elizabeth Warren’s efforts to prevent the 
confirmation of the undersecretary for domestic finance). 
 52. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 913, 922, 935–46 (2009). 
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below,” but also an increase in political opposition to such 
subcabinet-level nominees.53 
B. Against Institutional Innovation 
The strongest similarity between Free Enterprise Fund and Noel 
Canning, however, lies in their shared resistance to innovation in 
government. Both majority decisions treat such novelty as 
constitutionally suspect. In Free Enterprise Fund, the majority 
repeatedly characterized the PCAOB as presenting a “novel 
structure” and “a new situation not yet encountered by the Court.”54 
The Court openly expressed its constitutional skepticism about 
innovation, agreeing with the dissenting judge below that “the most 
telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of 
historical precedent” for Congress’s action.55 And the majority’s 
excision of established governance structures from the scope of its 
holding is yet another signal of its institutional conservatism, in the 
Burkean sense of resistance to change and support for the status 
quo.56 Strikingly, even Justice Breyer’s dissent appeared to resist 
institutional innovation. Instead of defending the PCAOB on the 
ground that novel structures were needed to respond to failures in 
accounting oversight, he argued that the double for-cause structure of 
the PCAOB was not new at all and contended that the decision called 
into question the constitutionality of “hundreds, perhaps thousands,” 
of high-level positions.57 
In Noel Canning, novelty was doubly present: first, with respect 
to the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the recess-appointments power was 
only available for vacancies that arose during intersession recesses; 
 
 53. See Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Appointments Process and the 
Administrative Presidency, 39 PRES. STUD. Q. 38, 41, 48–49 (2009); see infra notes 88–94 and 
accompanying text. See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL 
HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY (1995) (describing the creeping 
accretion of bureaucrats in the federal administration, which decreases the efficacy of 
administrative institutions through a diffusion of responsibility). 
 54. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483, 496 (2010); 
see also id. at 501 (“[W]e deal with the unusual situation, never before addressed by the Court, 
of two layers of for-cause tenure.”); id. at 514 (“[T]he Act before us imposes a new type of 
restriction.”). 
 55. Id. at 505 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 
667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), aff’d in part and reversed in part, 561 U.S. 
477). 
 56. See supra notes 34, 47 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8.  
 57. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and second, in President Obama’s use of the recess-appointments 
power when the Senate was formally in session. The majority 
repeatedly emphasized this first manifestation, assigning longstanding 
historical practice substantial weight in separation-of-powers 
analysis.58 By contrast, the majority made no mention of the fact that 
the President had used the recess-appointments power as it had never 
been used before.59 The majority’s silence on this point is somewhat 
surprising, given its holding that this use of the power was 
unconstitutional and its reliance elsewhere on historical practice. One 
reason may be that emphasizing the novelty of Obama’s actions 
flagged the equally novel character of pro forma sessions, a feature of 
the case the majority sidestepped by focusing on the broad textual 
grants to the two houses of Congress to control their own internal 
operations.60 
This Burkean stance has surfaced elsewhere in the Roberts 
Court’s jurisprudence, most prominently in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),61 in which the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) 
individual mandate.62 In the course of holding that the individual 
mandate fell outside of the commerce power, Chief Justice Roberts 
portrayed it as unprecedented, arguing that “Congress ha[d] never 
attempted to . . . compel individuals not engaged in commerce to 
purchase an unwanted product.”63 According to the Chief Justice, 
such “new conceptions of federal power” at least created good reason 
for careful consideration of their implications: “Legislative novelty is 
not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything. But 
sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional 
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s 
action.”64 
 
 58. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60, 2564, 2573, 2577 
(2014). 
 59. Id. at 2573–77. 
 60. Another factor may be that the Noel Canning majority was composed largely of 
Justices who had resisted attacks on innovation in decisions such as National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 61. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 62. Id. at 2577. 
 63. Id. at 2586. 
 64. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 
(2010)); see also id. at 2599 (distinguishing the “novel course of directing individuals to purchase 
insurance” under the commerce power from “Congress’s use of the Taxing Clause to encourage 
buying something,” which was “not new”). 
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Such resistance to innovation is not a dominant trait of the 
Roberts Court’s constitutional jurisprudence writ large.65 In its first 
years, the Roberts Court seemed inclined in a more minimalist 
direction, opting for narrow constitutional decisions that severed a 
constitutionally troublesome application or read a statutory provision 
in such a way as to avoid invalidation.66 But the Court soon 
demonstrated it was quite willing to act more dramatically. Its narrow 
as-applied limitation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA) in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life67 became a broadscale 
rejection of the BCRA’s constitutionality and the constitutionality of 
longstanding bans on direct corporate campaign contributions in 
Citizens United v. FEC.68 Similarly, the Court’s limited expansion of 
the Voting Rights Act’s (VRA’s) bailout provision in Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder69 evolved in 
Shelby County v. Holder70 into an invalidation of the VRA’s coverage 
formula, which in practice undid the law’s core preclearance process. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s efforts to defend the decisions in 
Citizens United and Shelby County as in keeping with original 
understandings,71 it is hard to view decisions striking down 
longstanding regulatory arrangements as Burkean or anti-innovation. 
Similarly, the Roberts Court’s willingness to overturn longstanding 
constitutional precedent fits poorly with an account of its 
 
 65. For the somewhat contrasting view that “[t]he Roberts Court has regularly relied on 
traditionalism in constitutional cases,” see Louis Virelli, Jr., Constitutional Traditionalism and 
the Roberts Court, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 39–61 (2011). 
 66. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts 
Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2009) (analyzing the Roberts Court’s conservative 
preference for as-applied challenges over facial challenges); see also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 
444–45 (noting that “on prominent occasions, [Roberts] seems to write as a self-conscious 
Burkean”). 
 67. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 68. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347–56 (2010) (overturning 
federal prohibition on corporate campaign contributions); see also id. at 394–95 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that national restrictions on corporate political contributions date back to 
1907).  
 69. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 70. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–29 (2013) (holding Section 4 of 
the 1965 VRA unconstitutional); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204 (noting, in dicta, that “[t]he Act’s 
preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions”); see 
also Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 713, 714 (2014).  
 71. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623–25; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353–54; id. at 386–
93 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
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jurisprudence as legalistic or dominated by a commitment to the rule 
of law.72 
How then to explain the anti-innovation theme of NFIB, Free 
Enterprise Fund, and Noel Canning? Notably, all three decisions 
address matters of constitutional structure more than individual 
rights, suggesting that the Roberts Court may be particularly 
reluctant to countenance innovation in the federal government’s 
institutional arrangements or assertions of authority. This explanation 
is not fully satisfying, given that Shelby County similarly addressed 
questions of structure and authority, specifically the federal 
government’s power to subject state governments to preclearance of 
any changes to their voting arrangements. Yet a striking feature of 
Shelby County is the majority’s insistent characterization of the VRA 
as the truly radical innovation—an “extraordinary” and “drastic 
departure from basic principles of federalism” made necessary by 
“exceptional conditions.”73 On this view, Shelby Country falls into line 
with the other three structural cases, as an instance when the Court 
resisted the political branches’ willingness to reenact innovative 
structures and assertions of power. Moreover, the Court has invoked 
novelty as grounds for constitutional suspicion of governance 
measures in the past, particularly with respect to measures that affect 
federal–state relationships.74 
Yet another cause of the Court’s resistance to innovation is its 
constitutional interpretive methodology. That constitutional 
innovation fits poorly with originalism is hardly a surprise given 
originalism’s rejection of the idea that constitutional meaning evolves 
over time.75 More surprising perhaps is that a similar resistance to 
innovation results from an approach that does accept evolving 
meaning and accords constitutional significance to political practices 
that have emerged over time. This was the approach of the Noel 
Canning majority, which self-consciously assigned pride of place to 
“‘long settled and established practice’” in separation-of-powers 
 
 72. For a condemnation of the Roberts Court as failing to adhere to rule-of-law values, see 
generally Eric J. Segall, Is the Roberts Court Really a Court?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 701 (2011).  
 73. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618; see Hasen, supra note 70, at 726–28.  
 74. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743–45 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 905–17, 925 (1997).  
 75. See Randy Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 
412–18 (2013) (describing originalism’s theoretical commitments and identifying its central 
normative claim as being that “the original meaning of the text provides the law that legal 
decisionmakers are bound by or ought to follow”). 
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analysis as against the dissent’s originalist analysis.76 The prime 
justifications for an emphasis on historical practice are that it respects 
the separation-of-powers understandings and agreements of political 
branches.77 Ironically, however, one unintended cost of such an 
approach may be a diminution of the political branches’ ability to 
craft new understandings, given that by definition such emergent 
views would lack the lengthy provenance identified as critical to 
constitutional legitimacy.78 
II.  APPOINTMENTS IN THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
Turning from the courts to politics, a very different image of 
appointments emerges. Filling vacancies, rather than removing sitting 
officeholders, is the central challenge. Moreover, the defining 
characteristic of the current appointment process, and of 
congressional–executive interactions more broadly, is novelty. 
Established mechanisms for policysetting and compromise are being 
cast aside, the casualties of increasing polarization in Congress 
combined with divided government and presidential political 
imperatives. New norms and governing approaches are emerging, 
with a heavy emphasis on executive action. Although prior practices 
may return with a switch to unified government, good reason exists to 
expect innovation even then. 
 
 76. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (quoting 
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)). Perhaps the most famous articulation of this 
mode of analysis is Justice Frankfurter’s statement that “a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged 
in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such 
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 
‘executive Power’ vested in the President.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a detailed and sophisticated assessment of 
historical practice in separation-of-powers analysis, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor 
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).  
 77. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559–60 (identifying such practices as “liquidat[ion]” of the 
meaning of separation of powers by the political branches that deserve deference in part 
because of the branches’ representative legitimacy) (quoting James Madison, Letter to Spencer 
Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908)); 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways 
of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give 
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 76, at 
343–47 (describing justifications based on acquiescence, waiver, and institutional competency).  
 78. Alternative justifications offered in defense of this approach are that it represents a 
Burkean respect for the status quo and legitimizes constitutional analysis by tying it to 
operational reality, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 76, at 356–61, but these goals may be in 
some tension if operational reality is in a process of change. 
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A. Contemporary Politics and the Separation of Powers 
1. Appointments.  Perhaps the most notable feature of the 
appointments process today is the difficulty involved in filling top 
positions. As Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell notes in a leading 
study, “The length of federal agency vacancies is staggering,” with 
“Senate-confirmed position[s] . . . empty (or filled by acting officials), 
on average, one quarter of the time over th[e] administrations” of 
President Jimmy Carter through President George W. Bush.79 These 
vacancies represent a combination of delays in initially filling 
positions to delays in filling offices once initial appointees leave. The 
relatively short tenure of appointees, estimated at one to two years, 
exacerbates the frequency of unfilled vacancies.80 Other contributing 
causes are complicated White House and Senate processes for 
nomination and confirmation, statutory qualifications for offices that 
limit the pool of qualified candidates, and statutory confirmation 
requirements for appointments that the Constitution would treat as 
inferior officers.81 The effect, particularly when combined with 
limitations on appointment of acting heads during vacancies, is to 
undermine agencies’ ability to function and take action on major 
issues.82 Given that Presidents are often judged on their ability to 
govern effectively, delays in appointment may well be a more burning 
issue for presidential control of the administrative state than 
restrictions on removal.83 
 
 79. See O’Connell, supra note 52, at 922, 950–59.  
 80. Id. at 919 & n.23 (noting a Government Accountability Office report finding a median 
appointee tenure of 2.1 years from 1981–1991, and a RAND study reporting an eleven to twenty 
month tenure for high-level defense officials from 1947-1999, along with other similar 
estimates); see also Matthew Dull, Patrick S. Roberts, Michael Keeney & Sang Ok Choi, 
Appointee Confirmation and Tenure: The Succession of U.S. Federal Agency Appointees, 1989–
2009, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 902, 904–05 (Nov.–Dec. 2012) (providing a slightly longer average 
of 2.8 years, with 3.3 years on average for agency heads). 
 81. See O’Connell, supra note 52, at 927–32, 965–74; see also infra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. See O’Connell, supra note 52, at 936–52 (assessing costs and benefits to agency 
functioning from vacancies). 
 83. See id. at 921 (“Participants in debates over the unitary theory of the executive might 
want to spend less time assessing the legitimacy of restrictions on the president’s removal power 
and instead pay more attention to analyzing the absence of presidential appointments at the 
front end of the process.”); see also LEWIS, supra note 51, at 55 (noting the abysmal federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina, specifically the role of political appointees, and arguing that 
“[s]ince voters and history judge presidents for the performance of the entire federal 
government during their tenure, this creates incentives for presidents to ensure that policy 
outcomes, both legislative and administrative, are under their control”); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
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Delays in staffing agencies are not a new phenomenon, but 
several recent developments have made the problem worse. One is 
the expansion in senators’ use of holds on nominees. Holds are an 
informal Senate custom under which senators—in a group or 
individually—can “stop . . . floor consideration of legislation or 
nominations simply by making requests of their party leaders not to 
take up such matters.”84 Senators can place any number of temporary 
or indefinite holds, and until recently could do so largely in secret.85 
Even senators of the President’s own party have wielded this power 
against nominees, as Senator Claire McCaskill’s hold on President 
Obama’s nomination for the U.S. Space Command demonstrates.86 A 
hold signals the senator’s intention to object to consideration of the 
matter, and Senate leaders know that measures such as a filibuster or 
other tactics may result if floor consideration nonetheless goes 
forward.87 Although holds have a long pedigree, their regular use for 
executive-branch nominees is a more recent phenomenon. In 
previous eras, the Senate deferred more to the President’s choices.88 
Another new trend is the practice of “holding nominations hostage in 
order to extract concessions on other matters from the 
administration,” even while acknowledging the nominee’s 
 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 
(1985) (asserting that Presidents, unlike legislators, are judged based on the effect of general 
government policies); Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 239 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (explaining that 
Presidents are motivated by “political support and opposition, political strategy, and political 
tradeoffs,” and therefore value “‘responsive competence,’ not neutral competence”). 
 84. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 256 
(9th ed. 2014); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 60–62 (4th ed. 2012) 
(providing examples of hold letters). 
 85. See OLESZEK, supra note 84, at 256–60. The Senate passed a measure in 2011 to 
eliminate secret holds and require holds to be made public within two days, but its success in 
curbing secret holds remains to be seen, and prior reforms have not had much effect. See id.; see 
also Alexandra Arney, The Secret Holds Elimination Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 271, 273–75, 
278–85 (2011) (describing past practice and reforms). 
 86. See Craig Whitlock, Senator Continues To Block Promotion of Air Force General, 
WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senator-
continues-to-block-promotion-of-air-force-general/2013/06/06/bbf9ea0a-cee3-11e2-ac03-
178510c9cc0a_story.html. 
 87. See OLESZEK, supra note 84, at 257.  
 88. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 164–68; see also THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, 
IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 91–98 (1st ed. 2012) (providing data on Senate delays on 
executive-branch appointments); WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31685, 
PROPOSALS TO REFORM “HOLDS” IN THE SENATE 1–2 (2011) (noting that holds first became 
widespread in 1970s). 
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qualifications.89 A recent example is the Senate hold-up of U.S. 
ambassador confirmations to protest general filibuster reform.90 Nor 
are holds the only devices senators now use to prevent appointments 
from going forward; the pro forma sessions at issue in Noel Canning 
are another technique, as is refusing to attend committee hearings on 
nominees to deprive the committee of a necessary quorum.91 
These practices combine to create even longer confirmation 
delays, with high-level officials below the cabinet-secretary level 
suffering the most.92 Such delays led the Democratically controlled 
Senate to adopt a change to the filibuster in 2013, preventing its use 
on executive-branch and judicial nominees other than to the Supreme 
Court.93 Nonetheless, the appointments process continues to move 
slowly.94 Moreover, these delays and the increasingly contentious and 
burdensome appointments process have taken on a life of their own, 
serving to dissuade top candidates from agreeing or seeking to be 
nominated in the first place.95 
Expanded use of indefinite and secret holds on executive officials 
also signals a collapse of established norms governing the 
appointments process. Professor Michael Gerhardt has argued that 
given the thinness of constitutional requirements on appointments, 
“the driving force of the appointments process are the norms 
developed by Presidents and senators to constrain or guide their 
decision making.”96 Perhaps the most well known of these 
 
 89. SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 64; see also MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 98–100. 
 90. Anne Gearan & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Turf Fight Hurts Approval of Obama’s Diplomatic 
Nominees, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/senate-turf-fight-hurts-approval-of-obamas-diplomatic-nominees/2014/03/06/
f9640e72-a320-11e3-b865-38b254d92063_story.html. 
 91. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers 
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 943–45 & n.6 (2013); THOMAS E. 
MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH 162–69 (2009) (describing presidential 
deviation from judicial-appointment norms). 
 92. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 95; Juliet Eilperin, Chances for Obama 
Nominees to be Confirmed are Falling, Even with Over Two Years to Go, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chances-for-obama-nominees-to-be-confirmed-
are-falling-even-with-over-two-years-to-go/2014/03/26/73a87b84-b107-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572
_story.html; see also Weisman, supra note 51 (documenting the Senate’s rejection of Obama’s 
nominees to fill administration positions). 
 93. See Peters, supra note 7. 
 94. See Eilperin, supra note 92. 
 95. See id.; Norman Ornstein, Slow Confirmation Process is Hurting U.S. Government, 
ROLL CALL, June 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12062010. 
 96. GERHARDT, supra note 88, at 3. 
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appointments norms is senatorial courtesy, or the norm that a 
President will defer to the views of senators from his or her party in a 
state when deciding whom to nominate for federal offices for that 
state.97 Other longstanding norms are senatorial deference to 
presidential nominations to subcabinet offices and presidential 
notification before making recess appointments. Although these 
norms have proved resilient over the years, recent experience signals 
that many are eroding and are no longer reliable controls on the 
process.98 
2. Broader Separation-of-Powers Trends: Defaults, Shutdowns, 
and Executive Unilateralism.  These appointments norms are part of a 
much wider network of constitutional conventions, or “emergent, 
quasi-legal norms that organize the workings of government.”99 Even 
outside of the appointments context, many of the norms and 
conventions governing interbranch relationships—separation-of-
powers conventions, in Professor David Pozen’s terminology100—have 
eroded significantly in recent years. 
One prominent instance is the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011. Despite 
prior battles over raising the debt ceiling, “the mid-2011 political 
crisis was the first time that it appeared that Congress might just 
refuse to increase the debt ceiling” to cover the costs of spending it 
had already authorized.101 Instead, the expectation had always been 
that Congress would respond to the imperative of honoring national 
debts and protecting the financial markets against the harm of a U.S. 
 
 97. Id. at 143–45; Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The 
Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 284–85 
(2013). 
 98. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 91–100 (identifying greater resistance to 
executive-branch appointees); GERHARDT, supra note 88, at 145–53, 166–79 (describing failed 
presidential efforts to move away from senatorial courtesy); see also David E. Pozen, Self-Help 
and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 40–41 (2014) (observing that the norm against 
impeachment for nonfelony offenses is resilient). 
 99. Pozen, supra note 98, at 27. In David Pozen’s words, “[c]onstitutional conventions are 
often analogized to the rules of the game. They are rules that distribute responsibilities and 
facilitate cooperation among ‘the major organs and officers of government.’” Id. at 30 (quoting 
GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1 (1984)); see also Adrian Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–94 (2013) (describing 
constitutional conventions). 
 100. Pozen, supra note 98, at 27. 
 101. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional 
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1175, 1186–88 (2012); see also MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 5–8. 
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default. In fact, Congress did so again in 2011, but with strong 
statements of continued resistance from congressional leaders and not 
until the country’s credit rating had been downgraded.102 The 2011 
battles over spending were then replicated in 2013, resulting in a 
sixteen-day government shutdown before a budget deal was 
reached.103 Other examples of interbranch contestation and deviation 
from longstanding conventions are the significant increase in use or 
threatened use of the filibuster on legislation, dramatically expanded 
congressional investigations, and assertive congressional exercise of 
its contempt and subpoena powers.104 Moreover, even when 
legislation gets enacted, it increasingly takes an “unorthodox” route, 
with Congress using reconciliation bills and other measures to avoid 
the filibuster threat.105 
The President, too, has begun to set domestic policy in new ways. 
A major example is the Obama administration’s expanded use of 
waiver. In several critical policy contexts—such as healthcare, 
education, and welfare—the administration has waived key parts of 
governing statutes, for example waiving the adequate yearly progress 
requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act.106 Although waivers 
are statutorily authorized and have been used previously, their 
employment to dramatically alter a statutory regime is a new 
development.107 The Obama administration has also used its 
immigration-enforcement discretion to create affirmative programs 
granting relief from deportation for millions of aliens.108 Moreover, 
 
 102. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 101, at 1178–79; Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-25, § 401, 125 Stat. 240, 259–63 (2011) (establishing Joint Select Committee on Deficit 
Reduction to recommend legislation that would reduce deficit by $1.5 trillion by 2021). 
 103. See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending Crisis Over 
Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, at A1. 
 104. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 5, 80–84; John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Attorney 
General Eric Holder Held in Contempt of Congress, POLITICO, June 26, 2012, http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0612/77988.html (noting the House vote “to hold Attorney General 
Eric Holder in contempt of Congress over his failure to turn over documents related to the Fast 
and Furious scandal, the first time Congress has taken such a dramatic move against a sitting 
Cabinet official”); Ezra Klein, Let’s Talk: The Move to Reform the Filibuster, NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 28, 2013, at 24 (“From 1917 to 1970, the majority sought cloture fifty-eight times. Since the 
start of President Obama’s first term, it has sought cloture more than two hundred and fifty 
times.”).  
 105. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 101–06; Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 97, at 299–315. 
 106. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
265, 279–81 (2013). 
 107. See id. at 267–68; Pozen, supra note 98, at 5. 
 108. See Jeh C. Johnson, Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect 
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain 
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many of these measures came in response to congressional failure to 
enact legislation sought by the President, giving them even more of an 
interbranch aspect.109 Interestingly, the threatened debt default also 
led to calls for the President to act unilaterally by ignoring the debt 
ceiling, raising it under the authority of Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or achieving the same result by minting two one-trillion-
dollar platinum coins.110 Here, however, the Obama administration 
did not pursue executive action to fill a congressional void, insisting 
that only Congress had authority to raise the debt limit.111 
These moves have a punch–counterpunch quality. Actions by 
Congress and the President trigger responses that in turn trigger 
further reprisals. The recess-appointments saga is a prime example. 
There, Democrats initially instituted pro forma sessions as retaliation 
against what they perceived as President Bush’s failure to adequately 
consult on judicial appointments. Republicans during the Obama 
administration adopted the same technique to prevent appointments 
they opposed on policy grounds. President Obama then responded by 
asserting the right to make recess appointments during a pro forma 
session, the action Noel Canning rejected. These contests are 
alternatively referred to as constitutional showdowns, constitutional 
hardball, or constitutional institutional self-help.112 But however 
 
Individuals Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action
.pdf; Jeh C. Johnson, Memorandum on Enforcement Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion 3–6 
(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
 109. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 781, 787–92 (2013) (describing Obama’s actions as a response to the failure of the 
DREAM Act to get adopted); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 83, 114–15 (2012) (noting that the Obama administration included terms in waivers that 
it had sought in reform legislation). 
 110. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 101, at 177–81 (gathering suggestions and arguing 
that the President should have continued to borrow and ignored the debt ceiling as the least 
unconstitutional option). 
 111. Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t, to N.Y. Times (July 8, 
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Fact-Check-Treasury-General-
Counsel-George-Madison-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Op-Ed-on-14th-Amendment.aspx 
(stating that Secretary Geithner had “always viewed the debt limit as a binding legal constraint 
that can only be raised by Congress”). 
 112. See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 991, 991–93 (2008); Pozen, supra note 98, at 7; Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004). 
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denominated, their main feature is fluidity and dynamism, as each 
branch responds to new moves by the other. 
B. Innovation and Political Polarization 
The contemporary political reality of appointments, and 
congressional–executive relations more generally, is thus 
characterized by change and innovation. Many factors contributed to 
this situation, ranging from the Senate’s increased individualistic 
character, to greater centralized power in House party leaders, to 
particular politicians and their agendas, the permanent campaign, 
money in politics, transformations in media, and so on.113 But the 
single most important cause is growing polarization in national 
politics, particularly combined with divided government. Polarization 
not only leads to breakdowns in established norms; it also creates 
incentives to adopt novel governance strategies. Recognition of the 
polarization dynamic thus suggests that institutional innovation is 
only likely to grow at the national level. 
1. Political Polarization, Divided Government, and Innovation.  
Political scientists have documented significantly increased political 
polarization in Congress. The ideological gap between the two parties 
is growing, with increasingly consistent party divides across a range of 
policy issues. Although the Democratic Party has become somewhat 
more liberal, the main contributor to this ideological gap is a 
significant conservative shift in the Republican Party.114 Polarization is 
most acute among political elites, but there is also corresponding 
polarization in each party’s electoral base, with Americans 
developing more internally consistent ideological and policy views, 
and electoral units becoming more homogeneously partisan.115 A well-
recognized reason for this newfound ideological consistency within 
parties is the movement of southern Democrats to the Republican 
 
 113. For different accounts, see, for example, MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 8–15, 
31–80; SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 134–65; Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political 
Polarization, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT 
AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 224–32 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007); Pildes, 
supra note 9, at 286–88, 295–96, 319–21. 
 114. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED 
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 3, 23–31 (2006); Gary C. 
Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 PRES. STUD. Q. 
688, 690–700 (2013); Pildes, supra note 9, at 276–81. 
 115. Jacobson, supra note 114, at 691–97; Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in SOLUTIONS TO 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (draft at 4–10). 
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Party over the twentieth century’s later decades.116 A less commonly 
identified contributor is rising income inequality, with high-income 
voters increasingly identifying as Republicans and poorer voters as 
Democrats.117 
The effects of political polarization are intensified by divided 
government, in which at least one of the houses of Congress is in the 
hands of one party and the presidency is in the hands of the other. 
Divided government has become our national norm, occurring in two-
thirds of Congresses between 1955 and 2015.118 Moreover, differences 
in the distribution of the two parties’ voters makes divided 
government likely in the future. Republican voters are more 
efficiently distributed from their party’s perspective, in that they are 
spread more evenly across areas, whereas Democratic voters are 
concentrated in urban areas. According to political scientist Gary 
Jacobson, this distribution makes Republicans likely to continue to 
control the House. At the presidential level, Republican voters 
represent shrinking demographic categories, whereas Democrats 
have attracted growing ones. This suggests Democrats may continue 
to win at the presidential level, with ongoing divided government the 
result.119 
Debate exists on whether—and to what extent—divided 
government alone impacts Congress’s productivity, with recent 
scholarship arguing that it substantially lowers enactment of 
significant legislation.120 But adding in political polarization makes 
 
 116. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 44–54; Pildes, supra note 9, at 287–95. 
 117. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 114, at 71–109 (advancing income inequality as a major 
factor in polarization). 
 118. See Pildes, supra note 9, at 326; see also A Visual Guide: The Balance Of Power 
Between Congress and The Presidency, ABOUT.COM, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/us
government/l/bl_party_division_2.htm (containing data on divided government by Congress 
going back to 1945). 
 119. See Jacobson, supra note 114, at 704–05. 
 120. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Maxwell Palmer & Benjamin Schneer, Divided 
Government and Significant Legislation: A History of Congress from 1789-2010, at 2–6, 17–27 
(Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (describing scholarship and concluding that divided 
versus unified government does have a substantial impact on production of significant 
legislation, but cannot explain broad trends in legislation throughout Congress’s history); see 
also Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
519, 527 (1999) (concluding that divided government affects the “ability of the political system 
to address major policy issues”). But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY 
CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002, at xii, at 220–26 (2d ed. 2005) 
(finding that divided government did not affect the overall volume of major legislation, but 
noting greater conflict and more investigations during the period 1991–2002). 
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“periods of divided government especially prone to conflict and 
stalemate.”121 As Professor Pildes notes, earlier eras when divided 
government did not preclude significant legislation “occurred before 
the historical transformation and purification of the political parties” 
that exists today.122 Whether the resultant legislative inaction 
represents congressional dysfunction and gridlock, or instead the 
appropriate workings of our separation-of-powers system, is also 
disputed.123 Either way, however, the likely net effect is increased 
pressure on the President to address issues unilaterally and increased 
presidential willingness to do so in order to achieve desired policy.124 
A critical point to note is that even if political polarization and 
divided government lead to legislative inaction and gridlock, they 
nonetheless may spur innovation—although often the innovation they 
generate may lead to more inaction and gridlock. In particular, 
senators’ growing refusal to defer to the President’s executive 
nominations and their increased willingness to use holds to forestall 
confirmation reflect growing ideological divides.125 Indeed, political 
scientists Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian identify political 
polarization as a major factor behind increasing delays in Senate 
confirmation.126 Polarization also means that the President is more 
likely to have to win on a measure with just his or her party’s support, 
 
 121. See Jacobson, supra note 114, at 700–02; see also SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE INACTION 95–96 (2003) (concluding that “the 
higher the level of partisan polarization, the less likely issues are to be enacted into law” and 
that “[d]ivided party control of Congress and the presidency, in contrast, has little effect on an 
issue’s fate”). 
 122. Pildes, supra note 9, at 326. 
 123. Compare DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES DON’T 
KILL THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 14, 190 (2011) (arguing that Presidents had a success 
rate of around 60 percent under both unified and divided government), Josh Chafetz, The 
Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2081–82 (2013) (arguing that 
current legislative inaction reflects lack of strong majority support, not dysfunction), and R. 
Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” is not Our Central Problem and 
Constitutional Revision is not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768–69, 775–81 (2014) (detailing 
recent major legislation and arguing that the problem is not gridlock but programmatic 
overload), with MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 101–03 (arguing that dysfunction is 
created from combining the U.S. constitutional system with parliamentary-style parties and the 
parties’ asymmetric polarization), and Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and 
the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2218–21 (2013) (detailing 
evidence of legislative inaction and arguing Congress is gridlocked because it is unable to make 
substantive policy decisions). 
 124. McCarty, supra note 113, at 246. 
 125. SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 63. 
 126. Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive 
Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1136 (1999). 
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and an opposing party representative has little incentive to 
cooperate.127 To the contrary, refusing to compromise serves to win 
points with the party’s now more ideological faithful.128 Furthermore, 
when lack of cooperation forestalls legislation—whether as a result of 
legislative mechanisms such as the filibuster or because of the 
impossibility of getting bicameral agreement when the opposition 
party controls one house of Congress—the President has turned to 
new forms of unilateral action to achieve policy reform. In sum, to a 
large extent the recent innovations in how the branches operate and 
interact can be traced to political polarization and divided 
government. 
2. Political Polarization, United Government, and Regulatory 
Innovation.  Interestingly, political polarization may contribute to 
innovation in periods of united government as well. To begin with, 
dilatory tactics like the filibuster may become even more important 
mechanisms for the minority party to wield, as it cannot rely on 
control of one chamber to prevent the enactment of legislation. 
Hence, new or more extreme uses of such tactics may emerge. At the 
same time, the majority party may itself utilize new legislative 
methods in order to constrain or avoid minoritarian resistance.129 
A prime example of these dynamics is the growing use of 
reconciliation bills as the means to legislative enactment. 
Reconciliation developed as a technique for imposing discipline on 
the congressional budgeting process, and involves enactment of an 
omnibus bill that aligns spending targets with policy proposals.130 The 
key feature of reconciliation is that all debate on a reconciliation bill 
or its amendments is limited to twenty hours, thereby precluding a 
filibuster threat.131 As a result, the reconciliation process has proved 
crucial in passing contentious legislation for which there is majority 
support but less than sixty votes in the Senate. Two prominent recent 
examples are the Bush income tax cuts in 2001 and the ACA in 
2009.132 But the procedural requirements of reconciliation, in 
 
 127. SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 163; Jacobson, supra note 114, at 700. 
 128. See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 8–29 (describing stances of key 
congressional leaders in the 2011 debt-ceiling crisis). 
 129. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 164. 
 130. See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 97, at 294–95, 297–98 (describing reconciliation 
procedures). 
 131. Id. at 295. 
 132. Id. at 308–15. 
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particular the Byrd Rule, can significantly affect the shape of policy 
adopted through this route.133 The Byrd Rule, which can only be 
waived by a three-fifths vote, prohibits inclusion of extraneous 
provisions in a reconciliation bill.134 
A second reason to expect innovation is that Congress is unlikely 
to do much checking of the President in periods of high polarization 
and unified government. As Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard 
Pildes argue, the checks in our separation-of-powers system result 
more from party and political identification than institutional loyalty. 
Members of Congress are more likely to check overreaching by a 
President of the opposite party than a President of their own.135 
Polarization is only likely to intensify this dynamic, and unified 
government means that the President’s party can prevent 
congressional investigations into new presidential assertions of 
authority. Indeed, some scholars point to the unified government that 
existed during most of the first six years of the George W. Bush 
presidency as proof of this phenomenon, noting for example that no 
congressional committee subpoenaed the White House in that 
period.136 
Lastly, innovation seems likely with respect to regulatory 
substance. The legislation that gets enacted may represent more 
dramatic regulatory changes in periods of united government and 
polarization. One reason is because polarization pulls each party 
away from the center and makes moderating bipartisan compromises 
less likely to occur.137 In addition, the lower possibility of bipartisan 
support means that passage turns on getting all party members on 
board, thereby increasing the leverage of members pushing for more 
radical measures. As McCarty argues, to pass in a polarized 
environment “policies must generate overwhelming support within 
the majority party . . . . Because it is difficult to replace the votes of 
more extreme elements with those of moderates from the other 
party, . . . policy outcomes may be more extreme relative to the 
political center.”138 The extent of a party’s majority in the Senate 
 
 133. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 187, 210–22 (describing the impact of reconciliation on 
the ACA); McCarty, supra note 113, at 236.  
 134. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 126–27. 
 135. See Daryl A. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313–15 (2006). 
 136. See Pildes, supra note 9, at 327 n.214; MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 151. 
 137. See Jacobson, supra note 114, at 697–702. 
 138. McCarty, supra note 113, at 244.  
METZGER IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETED) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2015  6:34 PM 
2015] THE JUDICIAL–POLITICAL DIVIDE 1635 
should affect whether this result actually obtains, however, as more 
extreme legislation also seems likely to trigger a filibuster.139 
Here, too, recent legislative experience may offer some support, 
but the evidence is much more ambiguous. The last period of unified 
government, during President Obama’s first term in office, witnessed 
the enactment of two major federal regulatory statutes, the ACA and 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act.140 Included within these 
statutes were notably innovative measures—the individual mandate 
deemed suspiciously novel in NFIB, novel regulatory structures 
involving the states, a new resolution process for too-big-to-fail 
banks, and creation of a new consumer financial protection agency 
with a unique organizational structure and many levels of political 
insulation.141 Significantly, the ACA passed on a straight party-line 
vote.142 Only a few Republicans—three in the House and three in the 
Senate—broke party ranks to vote for Dodd–Frank, and accounts 
detail the extensive efforts by party leaders to keep all Democrats on 
board.143 On the other hand, many of the more radical proposals 
included in the initial measures—most notably the public option for 
health insurance and a tax on big banks and hedge funds—did not 
make it into the final bills.144 Moreover, a confluence of separate 
factors could explain the successful enactment of these major reform 
measures, such as that this period marked the first time that the 
Democrats were in unified control in fourteen years.145 And the issues 
involved carried particular public salience, given the recent financial 
disaster and longstanding calls for healthcare reform. Hence, drawing 
 
 139. See BINDER, supra note 121, at 97–98. 
 140. See Melnick, supra note 123, at 779–80. 
 141. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 572–
94 (2011) (describing the ACA, Dodd–Frank, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and 
the Recovery Act); David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 121–29 (2010) 
(describing Dodd–Frank’s new resolution authority). 
 142. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 218–30 (describing the vote on the ACA). 
 143. See Mike Ferrullo, Regulatory Reform: House Clears Financial Reform Bill Along Party 
Lines, Senate Action Delayed, 95 BNA BANKING REP. 5, 5 (July 6, 2010) (reporting that Dodd–
Frank passed by a vote of 237–192 in the House, with three Republican votes in favor); Mike 
Ferrullo et al., Regulatory Reform: Senate Sends Financial Regulatory To White House for 
President’s Signature, 95 BNA BANKING REP. 90, 90 (July 20, 2010) (reporting that Dodd–Frank 
passed by a vote of 60–39 in the Senate, with votes from three Republican senators (Senators 
Scott Brown, Susan Collins, and Olympia Snowe)). 
 144. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 205–06, 215–16; David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Tax is 
Dropped in Overhaul of Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B1. 
 145. See BINDER, supra note 121, at 27. But see Ansolabehere, supra note 120, at 25–26 
(finding that the previous party in control had no effect on rates of legislation). 
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any reliable conclusions about whether polarization and unified 
government may yield substantive innovative measures in this fashion 
requires a more solid empirical foundation, tracing legislative 
enactments over multiple periods of unified government.146 
III.  ASSESSING THE JUDICIAL–POLITICAL DIVIDE 
In short, examination of appointments in the judicial and 
political branches reveals a notable contrast: the political branches 
currently embrace innovation in the mechanisms of governance, while 
the courts view such innovation as constitutionally suspect. Should 
this judicial–political disconnect be a cause of concern? Or is it 
actually a signal of the constitutional system’s checks and balances 
working effectively? 
On the positive view, the courts’ reluctance to sanction 
institutional innovation is an important counterweight to the political 
branches’ inclinations to pervert the constitutional structure for 
partisan gain. Judicial resistance is offered as the constitutional 
protection against the dangers of political polarization. Noel Canning 
is Exhibit A in support of this account, with the Court there 
unanimously rejecting a novel presidential assertion of the recess-
appointments power that on its face was incompatible with the 
Constitution’s text. A similar argument animates other fabled 
separation-of-powers decisions, such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 
in which one political branch failed to curb unconstitutional 
overreach by another.147 As Justice Scalia stated in his Noel Canning 
dissent, “policing the ‘enduring structure’ of constitutional 
government when the political branches fail to do so is ‘one of the 
most vital functions of this Court.’”148 
Although not without appeal, this positive account of the current 
judicial–political disconnect is simply too sanguine. It ignores the real 
 
 146. Generating such data is difficult at the federal level, given the dominance of divided 
government. But unified government is much more common at the state level. 
 147. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13, 944 (1983) (emphasizing that neither the 
convenience of the legislative veto nor the fact that the President signed legislation containing it 
should affect analysis of its compatibility with constitutional separation of powers); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952) (noting that the President informed 
Congress of his action in seizing the steel mills and that Congress did not act). 
 148. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2559, 2593 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
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risk that the courts may intervene asymmetrically and in ways that 
amplify rather than dampen the harmful effects of polarization. One 
point worth noting at the outset is that many, if not most, of the 
innovations in congressional–executive interactions will avoid judicial 
review. As the Court noted in Noel Canning, the Constitution 
“explicitly empowers”149 each house to “determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings,”150 and “‘all matters of method are open to [its] 
determination,’” provided the method chosen is rationally related to 
the goal sought and does not violate constitutional rights.151 
Executive-branch actions, in turn, may escape review because no one 
has standing to sue.152 
In addition, judicial review is likely to be asymmetrical when it 
occurs. Judicial review is more probable when action by Congress or 
the President affects individuals outside of the political branches.153 It 
is also more likely to be available to police legislative or executive 
action than inaction.154 Thus, delaying and dilatory tactics in Congress 
will avoid scrutiny, but novel measures used to enact policy in the 
face of such tactics will not. This privileging of legislative inaction 
holds real potential for worsening the gridlock often viewed today as 
lying at the root of Congress’s dysfunction.155 Worse, given the 
possibility that legislative measures enacted in periods of higher 
polarization may be more radical, the judicial resistance to innovation 
raises a real risk of judicial invalidation of those measures that do 
manage to be enacted. The net result is again a privileging of inaction 
and of judicial impediments to majoritarian government. Moreover, 
although there have been instances in which legislative inaction has 
worked in the direction of greater regulation—the failure to extend 
 
 149. Id. at 2574 (majority opinion). 
 150. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2), 
 151. Id. (quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 
2; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (meaning of “try” with respect to 
impeachment is a political question and thus left to the Senate to determine). 
 152. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Suit on Health Law Puts Focus on Funding Powers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2014, at A25 (noting a significant standing hurdle to a House effort to sue on ACA 
waivers). 
 153. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (identifying as legislative actions those that 
“had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . 
outside the legislative branch”). 
 154. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985). 
 155. This is, to be sure, a matter of debate. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justice Scalia: 
Americans “Should Learn to Love Gridlock,” L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005.  
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the Bush tax cuts for high-income earners or the failure to enact 
legislation overturning Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
greenhouse-gas regulations—judicial resistance to innovation seems 
likely to work to the advantage of those opposing major new 
regulatory initiatives. 
A final reason to be concerned is that major innovations in 
governance structures may represent the best available 
countermeasures to hyperpolarization in Congress. Reform proposals 
run the gamut, but focus in particular on changes to core features of 
our political system.156 Examples include mandating open primaries, 
getting rid of first-past-the-post election systems, or mandating 
redistricting reform.157 Many of these measures would mark a 
dramatic change from longstanding practices. A Supreme Court that 
views innovation with suspicion, accepting changes that have emerged 
incrementally over time and are supported by historical practice, is 
unlikely to be a receptive audience for such reform measures. Hence, 
the danger is that rather than serve as a bastion defending the 
constitutional separation-of-powers system against newfound partisan 
threats, the Court will impede the very innovations needed to make 
that system continue to function. 
These risks might be unavoidable if the Constitution embodied 
the anti-innovation principle that animates the Roberts Court’s 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. But the constitutional basis for 
such resistance to structural and governance innovation is quite 
dubious. As Justice Ginsburg remarked, dissenting in NFIB, “For 
decades, the Court has declined to override legislation because of its 
novelty, and for good reason. As our national economy grows and 
changes, we have recognized, Congress must adapt to the changing 
 
 156. An alternative route is to move the focus away from Congress toward other 
policymakers, such as administrative agencies and states or even private actors, accepting that 
Congress is unlikely to be the first mover in addressing critical policy issues. See Melnick, supra 
note 123, at 782–89; Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the 
Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1399–1401 (2013). Such a change in focus 
would accord with broader regulatory trends—for example, toward privatization and delegation 
of increasing programmatic discretion to the states. See Metzger, supra note 141, at 568–71; Jon 
D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 517–19 
(2015). 
 157. See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 131–76. But see Nolan McCarty, 
Reducing Polarization: Some Facts for Reformers, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 2–4, 26, 32–33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2564372 (questioning whether opening primaries will reduce polarization and suggesting 
that strengthening party organization, as well as creating more politically homogenous districts, 
is better suited to achieving this goal).  
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economic and financial realities.”158 The ability to design innovative 
governmental structures or regulatory measures is a flexibility the 
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause gives to Congress.159 
Professor John Manning argues that this textual assignment to 
Congress calls into question the Court’s refusal to defer to 
“Congress’s implementation strategies on the basis of abstract 
structural inferences about which reasonable people can doubtless 
differ.”160 But one can accept judicial reliance on abstract structural 
inferences and still conclude that a judicial default rule against novel 
congressional measures is at odds with the constitutional allocation of 
implementation authority to Congress.161  
Importantly, however, this constitutional defense of innovation 
only operates with respect to congressional measures. Executive-
branch novelty, such as President Obama’s invocation of the recess-
appointments power during a pro forma session, cannot be vindicated 
on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This is all the more 
true given that the President justified his actions as a response to 
Congress’s innovative use of pro forma sessions to prevent recess 
appointments. But even executive-branch innovation should not 
trigger automatic suspicion. David Pozen contends that such 
unilateral executive measures may be an effort to restore the 
constitutional separation-of-powers balance rather than undermine it: 
“[M]any of the most pointed ways in which Congress and the 
President challenge one another can plausibly and profitably be 
modeled as self-help . . . efforts to enforce constitutional settlements,” 
in particular settlements in the form of established conventions of 
“comity and cooperation in governance” that are central to the 
 
 158. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 159. See Manning, supra note 33, at 6–7. 
 160. Id. at 48. 
 161. Some read the Necessary and Proper Clause in a more limited fashion than Manning, 
as only supporting grants of incidental powers or institutional structures that comport with 
general federalism and separation-of-powers principles. Compare William Baude, Rethinking 
the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1749, 1750–55 (2013) (distinguishing 
between great and incidental powers and arguing the Necessary and Proper Clause only 
incorporates the latter), and Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of 
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297–
326, 330–33 (1993) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is limited by traditional 
federalism and separation-of-powers principles), with Manning, supra note 33, at 5–7, 54–60. 
But even these more limited readings of the Clause do not support a general suspicion of 
innovation. 
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functioning of our separation-of-powers system.162 From this 
perspective, President Obama’s recess appointments can be seen as 
an effort to respond to the Senate’s deviation from constitutional 
conventions governing the appointments process, and to intense 
congressional obstruction more generally.163 To be sure, accepting the 
self-help description does not make the President’s actions 
constitutional, and there are good reasons—particularly in an age of 
ever-expanding unilateral presidential power—to resist 
countenancing such moves.164 Whether or not the institutional self-
help justification is persuasive as a matter of constitutional analysis, 
however, it highlights the contemporary political context that is 
strikingly absent from the Noel Canning decision. 
These criticisms suggest that the Court should adopt a more fine-
grained approach, one that assesses each measure without a 
predisposition against innovation and pays more attention to political 
realities. One central feature that deserves greater play in a more 
nuanced analysis is whether the innovation represents a unilateral 
action by the President or a measure on which the two branches 
agree. Although both types of innovation may be constitutional (or 
not), the threats they represent to constitutional structure are 
significantly different, and the Court’s elision of this distinction is a 
sign of its mistaken approach. The Court also would do well to 
engage more directly with the polarization and dysfunction that mark 
politics today, so that its analysis fully engages with the dynamics at 
play in instances of structural and governance innovations. This does 
not mean that the Court should sanction otherwise unconstitutional 
measures on the grounds that the current political climate renders 
such matters practically necessary. Noel Canning demonstrates that 
even the more functionalist members of the Court are unwilling to go 
 
 162. Pozen, supra note 98, at 8–9; see also Jody Freeman & Davin B. Spence, Old Statutes, 
New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“[C]ongressional dysfunction invites agencies 
and courts to do the work of updating statutes . . . . [A]gencies are better suited than courts to 
do that updating work and . . . because the agency is the legally designated custodian of the 
statute (so designated by the enacting Congress), the agency has the superior claim to interpret 
the statute’s application to new problems during periods of congressional quiescence.”). 
 163. Pozen, supra note 98, at 6–7, 39–48. 
 164. See William P. Marshall, Warning! Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 YALE L.J. F. 95, 
95–97 (2014); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 6 (2010) (“[T]he presidency represents the graver threat: while Schlesinger was 
prophetic in sounding the alarm, it has become a far more dangerous institution during the forty 
years since he wrote The Imperial Presidency—and these threatening trends promise to 
accelerate over the decades ahead.”). 
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so far, and with good reason.165 But contemporary political challenges 
and broader context seem a legitimate factor to take into account in 
assessing constitutionally uncertain innovations, just as contemporary 
regulatory challenges and economic realities underlie current 
assessments of the scope of Congress’s commerce power.166At a 
minimum, the Court should acknowledge the practical effect of its 
decisions, and seek to limit disruptive impacts where possible. Thus, 
for example, the Court could do more to resuscitate the de facto 
officer doctrine, which “confers validity upon acts performed by a 
person acting under the color of official title even though it is later 
discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment or election 
to office is deficient,” so as to limit the disruptive potential of 
decisions like Noel Canning.167 
Furthermore, the Court could also signal what constitutional 
options may be available to the President or Congress to combat the 
other branch’s excesses. Indeed, despite its failure to engage with the 
political background behind President Obama’s recess appointments, 
the Noel Canning majority provided such a signal, underscoring that 
“[t]he Constitution . . . gives the President . . . a way to force a recess” 
by adjourning Congress when the two houses disagree “with Respect 
to the Time of Adjournment.”168 It also cautioned that for the Senate 
to legitimately claim to be in session it needed to be able to conduct 
business under its rules and meet quorum requirements, thereby 
identifying how the President’s allies could challenge a pro forma 
session.169 In short, the Noel Canning Court implicitly recognized the 
need to respond to new political realities, but no reason exists to keep 
 
 165. For an earlier refusal, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732, 736 (1986) (invalidating 
novel budgetary measures adopted to help reduce growing deficits). 
 166. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–29 (1942). 
 167. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180–84 (1996) (discussing the de facto officer 
doctrine and limiting its scope). The issue of the de facto officer doctrine as a means of limiting 
the practical impact of overturning the recess appointments was raised at oral argument in Noel 
Canning. See Brian J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-Of-Powers Dialogue 
Continues, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 221, 253–54. 
 168. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014). 
 169. Id. at 2575–76 (“If any present Senator had raised a question as to the presence of a 
quorum, and by roll call it had become clear that a quorum was missing, the Senators in 
attendance could have directed the Sergeant at Arms to bring in the missing Senators.”); see 
also Tom Goldstein, Can a President (with a Little Help from One Senator of His Party) 
Circumvent Most of the Court’s Limitation on the Recess Appointments Power?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 25, 2014, 8:29 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/can-a-president-with-a-little-help-
from-one-senator-of-his-party-circumvent-most-of-the-courts-limitation-on-the-recess-
appointments-power. 
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this recognition implicit. Indeed, more forthright recognition might 
better protect the separation-of-powers system, both by creating 
disincentives for the political branches to push the limits of their 
powers and by publicly flagging the constitutional threat that political 
brinkmanship may pose. 
Both of these moves are of particular relevance to current 
struggles over appointments. As noted above, despite the focus on 
principal officers in Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning, the real 
battles today center on appointments to inferior officer positions that 
require Senate confirmation. Although Congress has the power to 
require such Senate approval, the fact that a Senate role is not 
constitutionally mandated, and the importance of such appointments 
for the executive branch to function, should affect the Court’s 
response to political branch innovations affecting inferior officer 
appointments. This seems a prime context for expansive invocation of 
the de facto officer doctrine to minimize disruption of a finding of 
invalidity. Doing so does not sanction a direct constitutional violation 
or deny the Senate its constitutionally protected role, which were 
prime concerns in Noel Canning.170 Indeed, Free Enterprise Fund 
supports taking a limited response to inferior officer appointments 
that meet constitutional but not statutory requirements. There, the 
Court cured the constitutional violation it identified with the PCAOB 
by simply severing Board members’ additional removal protection. 
The Court concluded that transforming them into inferior officers 
appointed and removed at will by a department head best served 
Congress’s intent in enacting Sarbanes–Oxley.171 In like vein, 
acceptance of past decisions by improperly appointed inferior officers 
can be justified as the remedial response that best serves 
congressional intent underlying the substantive statutes these officers 
implement. 
More dramatically, perhaps the Court should be more willing to 
sustain novel presidential actions installing nominees to these 
positions—in either an acting or full capacity—in the face of Senate 
refusal to vote on their nominations. Such actions represent an easier 
constitutional case than the recess appointments in Noel Canning 
because they do not violate constitutional appointment requirements. 
Thus, the executive branch’s need for these officers in order to 
 
 170. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59, 2574–77. 
 171. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010). 
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perform its constitutional and statutory responsibilities should enjoy 
greater weight in the constitutional analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is no surprise that judicial interpretation of an over-
220-year-old document displays suspicion of innovation in 
governance arrangements. But this judicial tendency bodes ill for the 
nation’s ability to respond to the highly politically polarized world in 
which we live. In such a world, governance innovation is inevitable 
and often beneficial. Rather than discourage innovation, the courts 
should seek to foster it in the hope that the political branches will 
construct measures that allow for a return to more effective 
government. 
 
